Tuesday, July 26, 2011

My guest post on the DIME Blog

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/blog/default.cfm?blog=dime

The Army War College's Information as Power Blog published a piece I wrote about tackling the Taliban's influence in preparation for a drawdown.

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

Egyptian Saif al-Adel interim AQ leader; UBL's baya to Taliban dead with him

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/05/17/mideast.al.qaeda.appointee/index.html?hpt=T1

Egyptian  Saif al-Adel named "acting" (read interim) leader of al Qaeda. Suggested could be to gauge supporter reaction to an Egyptian leader, paving way for al-Zawahiri to take over as permanent AQ leader. Even terrorists can be PR savvy. More interesting is the topic of baya (religious oath of allegiance). Bin Laden gave baya to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. That oath died with UBL and opens door for Omar/TB to sever ties with AQ and reconcile.

Monday, May 2, 2011

Why the Death of bin Laden means Something....and Nothing

    No doubt there will be pundits and experts caught up in patriotic fervor who will say the death of Osama bin Laden is a critical turning point. I would agree, if it were 2006 or earlier.  Now, his death is simply just as symbolic as was his life.The death means more to the US than UBL's supporters, just as his life was a symbol to his supporters of him being "untouchable." Well, the US just painted "touchable"with his blood in the information battle-space
    Now a symbol in this case is more like a rich/successful board member: he has cachet, brings some juice to the table, but doesn't really do anything and is not likely in control. His death will be lionized, morale will be deflated in some circles and jihad inspiration will be found in others. But losing a board member won't affect the "company" because the strategy, coordination, direction, decision making and the getting-it-done was done by other more active organization members, namely al-Zawahiri (think CEO). Now, al-Zawahiri's death would be cause for rejoicing as it would cause AQ great damage that would take years to recover from. Now that the symbol is dead, let's put our focus on the real AQ leader (s).
     Explaining my "if it were 2006" comment. With a small force commitment, before the resurgence of the Taliban and a change of our role and mission to include nation building, it would have been easy to declare "mission accomplished" and pull out. But we're fighting a different war now, much like Iraq in 2007 when GEN Petraeus was testifying to Congress. Neither war started out as a counter-insurgent effort with the intent to prop up a fragile democratic-ish government to achieve national security goals of stability in their respective regions. But that's what they became, and we have an obligation to see that through regardless of the initial motivation to get involved in either country. When are we leaving? No time soon, no matter how many UBLs, al-Zawahiris or al-Libis we take out.
       Now, an influencer's perspective-was the timing coincidental or purposely coinciding with the Taliban's self-proclaimed country-wide "Tet." If yes, then brilliant strategic thinking. If this occurred just one week earlier, it could have provided Taliban's spring offensive with a rally of support, inspiration, and recruits. But in the midst of the fizzling spring offensive, it can likely have a jarring effect on the morale of the foot soldiers needed to carry out efforts. Those same individuals/groupings also have the most vulnerable attachment to the Taliban as their tenuous commitment is rooted in many factors other than ideology. So in terms of event AND timing, we might see a turning point in the fight in Afghanistan, but al-Qaeda's crippling watershed moment has yet to occur.
     In any event, AQ just experienced the "Chicago Way," and that watershed moment may soon be within our reach.

 

Sunday, April 24, 2011

Trying to Solve Mysteries as Puzzles -do influencers have it wrong?


An excellent book I just finished reading was Malcolm Gladwell’s “What the Dog Saw”. I occasionally find his stories and points having great relevance to the field of influence (Is there any concept better boiled down than “stickiness” to describe influence objectives?). In the chapter Open Secrets, he breaks down if were really deceived by Enron by proposing there are two approaches to information gathering as it relates to solving either a puzzle or a mystery (his thesis is Enron was not a mystery because it provided full disclosure in all of its filing, it’s just that the amount and confusing projection of the information made it a puzzle to solve) . For the Cold War, intelligence gathering was solving a puzzle—we knew the players and boundaries, we just needed to “fill in the blanks” here and there. The hunt for UBL--a mystery. If it was a “fill in the blanks” puzzle problem-set, we would have much more quickly ended this hunt. The problem was, Gladwell proposes, is we tried to solve a mystery as if it were a puzzle. I pose that the challenge of truly succeeding in Counter-IED efforts is that we are approaching a mystery as a puzzle, and perhaps not knowing the difference. Using puzzle solving processes, to include assessing results/success/intelligence, on a mystery problem may be the proverbial “wrong tool for the job.” No matter your effort, your starting point/approach is all wrong, and won’t get better.

Do influence practitioners fall into the same trap? Our effects cousin, field artillery, operates in a “puzzle” battle-space: those practitioners know the physical layout, they engage when the enemy is found, fill in the blanks of the puzzle with assessments, repeat process. The influence or true information aspects of IO operate on a mystery basis: no eyes on target, receipt confirmation difficult, time and difficulty in assessing effects and causal actions, etc. This is why the OODA loop has been a flawed process when applied to IO: it’s a puzzle process and IO is a mystery. It’s the difference between two boxers in a ring (classic OODA loop situation: I know my opponent is going to engage; the puzzle is when, how, how hard and how frequent) and a boxer walking down a dark alley in a bad neighborhood in a nice suit and a lot of bling, facing a potential hidden opponent. The first is a puzzle, the second is a mystery.

Influence is mystery construct. Just because we know who how and maybe when to influence doesn’t mean it’s less of a mystery. Do we falter because we try to make it a puzzle with our approach to processes such as MOE? Presence, access, and awareness might be distinguishing qualifiers of a puzzle versus a mystery. A Tactical MISO Team that operates in a brigade AO might have success treating its problem-set as a puzzle, but what about a regional MISOTF? A GCC JSITF? Definitely at the mystery level, but our processes, doctrine, if not our analytical intuition drive to treat it as a puzzle. Are we using the wrong tools and mindset in strategic and operational IO, SC, MISO, PA or influence activity in general?

**An afterthought: How I would categorize the functions of the various IO capabilities-
Puzzle: EW, OPSEC, Deception, CNO, (CMO?), tactical MISO, KLE
Mystery: IO, SC, MISO, PA

Saturday, April 23, 2011

Levi's Levity 2

More Levi Levity. on today, his 7th b-day, I will share one of my many awesome stories of him from the past year. A few months ago, as I sat on the couch working on my laptop, Levi came in and instructed "Dad Norman, come with me. It is time for your (ninja) training." I responded with "Yes, Master," as I popped up to follow him, and he stops, swirls around gives me a stern stare and scolded "Dad Norman, I told you NEVER to call me "Master" outside of the lair!" Kewl, we have a LAIR!!!! Who knew? That's like platinum-level manspace.

Levi's Levity

A little off-topic, but these stories are gems!

So, my 6 year old son Levi recently offered me a job as a captain in his worldwide army of 100,000, which he commands. Says he has 3 captains now, but "I have an opening" (his words) for me if I am willing to train hard. I know the economic recovery is in full swing when my 6 year old is hiring.
I have not yet accepted the job. I'm still in training. There are 100 ninja levels (it is a ninja army) but I only have to do 12 to be a captain. I'm only level 2. I do have a certificate he made and awarded to me stating I am a level 2 ninja (beat that, Six Sigmas!!). [update-now Level 4]