Trying to Solve Mysteries as Puzzles -do influencers have it wrong?

An excellent book I just finished reading was Malcolm Gladwell’s “What the Dog Saw”. I occasionally find his stories and points having great relevance to the field of influence (Is there any concept better boiled down than “stickiness” to describe influence objectives?). In the chapter Open Secrets, he breaks down if were really deceived by Enron by proposing there are two approaches to information gathering as it relates to solving either a puzzle or a mystery (his thesis is Enron was not a mystery because it provided full disclosure in all of its filing, it’s just that the amount and confusing projection of the information made it a puzzle to solve) . For the Cold War, intelligence gathering was solving a puzzle—we knew the players and boundaries, we just needed to “fill in the blanks” here and there. The hunt for UBL--a mystery. If it was a “fill in the blanks” puzzle problem-set, we would have much more quickly ended this hunt. The problem was, Gladwell proposes, is we tried to solve a mystery as if it were a puzzle. I pose that the challenge of truly succeeding in Counter-IED efforts is that we are approaching a mystery as a puzzle, and perhaps not knowing the difference. Using puzzle solving processes, to include assessing results/success/intelligence, on a mystery problem may be the proverbial “wrong tool for the job.” No matter your effort, your starting point/approach is all wrong, and won’t get better.

Do influence practitioners fall into the same trap? Our effects cousin, field artillery, operates in a “puzzle” battle-space: those practitioners know the physical layout, they engage when the enemy is found, fill in the blanks of the puzzle with assessments, repeat process. The influence or true information aspects of IO operate on a mystery basis: no eyes on target, receipt confirmation difficult, time and difficulty in assessing effects and causal actions, etc. This is why the OODA loop has been a flawed process when applied to IO: it’s a puzzle process and IO is a mystery. It’s the difference between two boxers in a ring (classic OODA loop situation: I know my opponent is going to engage; the puzzle is when, how, how hard and how frequent) and a boxer walking down a dark alley in a bad neighborhood in a nice suit and a lot of bling, facing a potential hidden opponent. The first is a puzzle, the second is a mystery.

Influence is mystery construct. Just because we know who how and maybe when to influence doesn’t mean it’s less of a mystery. Do we falter because we try to make it a puzzle with our approach to processes such as MOE? Presence, access, and awareness might be distinguishing qualifiers of a puzzle versus a mystery. A Tactical MISO Team that operates in a brigade AO might have success treating its problem-set as a puzzle, but what about a regional MISOTF? A GCC JSITF? Definitely at the mystery level, but our processes, doctrine, if not our analytical intuition drive to treat it as a puzzle. Are we using the wrong tools and mindset in strategic and operational IO, SC, MISO, PA or influence activity in general?

**An afterthought: How I would categorize the functions of the various IO capabilities-

Puzzle: EW, OPSEC, Deception, CNO, (CMO?), tactical MISO, KLE

Mystery: IO, SC, MISO, PA

SECDEF releases Joint IO/SC reorg memo//25 Jan 2011

SECDEF released yesterday a memo outlining his decisions that effect the Joint IO/SC fields (I do not have a soft copy), namely IO management/oversight moving to USD(P), the USD (P) and ASD (PA) are co-leads for SC, and the re-org of JIOWC. I will write on the opinions/impact this will have on Joint IO. From the wording, it looks positive.

Can experienced IO Practitioners help DOS?

Does Department of State do regional/operational level strategies for objectives? Does South America department have a linked cohesive nested strategy in a region (like a COCOM) for PD, relations, and SC and development, or is it bottom driven? Does the country embassy determine objectives simply for his own country (his battlespace), and State just collates objectives for a region and conduct  a loose operation oversight, or do country embassy tie into its neighbors? DOS could benefit from top developed IO concepts/strategies that provide a cohesive focus without interfering in each embassy's operations.

What’s the private sector demand/niche for an out-of-work IO contractor extraordinaire?

What’s the private sector demand/niche for an out-of-work IO contractor extraordinaire?

Forward thinking Defense contracting companies should be mapping a strategy on the commercial/private industry application of warrior IO skills/experience. As one war winds down, and limited and possible dwindling funding for the remaining smaller war, the lucrative defense industry may soon see far less contracts in high demand areas of IO and intel. Don’t want to survive by being lucky, survive by being prescient. When the supplemental wave crashes, will you end up on the beach beached or on another breaker?

How do we bring our understanding of the information battlespace to the civilian government sector? DOS is an obvious choice, but what about DHS? DEA? FBI? Can the FBI use an IO planner to fix a fugitive, or make him move? Leaflets aside, why can’t we use the same IA collaboration developed to find AAM, but instead of it residing in DOD, it resides in the IA, supported by civ (not military) or contracted planners. If IO can work with intel and ops in the hunt for AAM, why can’t it be done domestically as well as internationally? The principles of enabling or exploiting operation and information success, synchronizing to support FBI or DEA operation objectives/intelligence collection requirements (do we want suspect to move/communicate, not move/communicate, communicate). Very likely that pieces are being done, but think back 10, 7 or even 4 years ago to when commander’s/staffs thought they were already doing IO because they had a Public Affairs officer or a TPD in direct support. The eaches don’t essentially make the whole, and the IO practitioners and the commanders and staffs they support have learned this well in the last five years. So if there is practical application in the government sector, consider the target audience that has to buy into this to be where our military leadership at various levels was 8-10 years ago.

The payoff is government agencies incorporating the IO practitioner capability for operational effectiveness. Since there are no civilian schools or feeder systems to create such a skillset, at least initially it may be contracted to quickly bring in those civilians and military who have developed said fundamentals, skills and intuition to support ops/intel.