Showing posts with label IO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IO. Show all posts

Monday, May 2, 2011

Why the Death of bin Laden means Something....and Nothing

    No doubt there will be pundits and experts caught up in patriotic fervor who will say the death of Osama bin Laden is a critical turning point. I would agree, if it were 2006 or earlier.  Now, his death is simply just as symbolic as was his life.The death means more to the US than UBL's supporters, just as his life was a symbol to his supporters of him being "untouchable." Well, the US just painted "touchable"with his blood in the information battle-space
    Now a symbol in this case is more like a rich/successful board member: he has cachet, brings some juice to the table, but doesn't really do anything and is not likely in control. His death will be lionized, morale will be deflated in some circles and jihad inspiration will be found in others. But losing a board member won't affect the "company" because the strategy, coordination, direction, decision making and the getting-it-done was done by other more active organization members, namely al-Zawahiri (think CEO). Now, al-Zawahiri's death would be cause for rejoicing as it would cause AQ great damage that would take years to recover from. Now that the symbol is dead, let's put our focus on the real AQ leader (s).
     Explaining my "if it were 2006" comment. With a small force commitment, before the resurgence of the Taliban and a change of our role and mission to include nation building, it would have been easy to declare "mission accomplished" and pull out. But we're fighting a different war now, much like Iraq in 2007 when GEN Petraeus was testifying to Congress. Neither war started out as a counter-insurgent effort with the intent to prop up a fragile democratic-ish government to achieve national security goals of stability in their respective regions. But that's what they became, and we have an obligation to see that through regardless of the initial motivation to get involved in either country. When are we leaving? No time soon, no matter how many UBLs, al-Zawahiris or al-Libis we take out.
       Now, an influencer's perspective-was the timing coincidental or purposely coinciding with the Taliban's self-proclaimed country-wide "Tet." If yes, then brilliant strategic thinking. If this occurred just one week earlier, it could have provided Taliban's spring offensive with a rally of support, inspiration, and recruits. But in the midst of the fizzling spring offensive, it can likely have a jarring effect on the morale of the foot soldiers needed to carry out efforts. Those same individuals/groupings also have the most vulnerable attachment to the Taliban as their tenuous commitment is rooted in many factors other than ideology. So in terms of event AND timing, we might see a turning point in the fight in Afghanistan, but al-Qaeda's crippling watershed moment has yet to occur.
     In any event, AQ just experienced the "Chicago Way," and that watershed moment may soon be within our reach.

 

Sunday, April 24, 2011

Trying to Solve Mysteries as Puzzles -do influencers have it wrong?


An excellent book I just finished reading was Malcolm Gladwell’s “What the Dog Saw”. I occasionally find his stories and points having great relevance to the field of influence (Is there any concept better boiled down than “stickiness” to describe influence objectives?). In the chapter Open Secrets, he breaks down if were really deceived by Enron by proposing there are two approaches to information gathering as it relates to solving either a puzzle or a mystery (his thesis is Enron was not a mystery because it provided full disclosure in all of its filing, it’s just that the amount and confusing projection of the information made it a puzzle to solve) . For the Cold War, intelligence gathering was solving a puzzle—we knew the players and boundaries, we just needed to “fill in the blanks” here and there. The hunt for UBL--a mystery. If it was a “fill in the blanks” puzzle problem-set, we would have much more quickly ended this hunt. The problem was, Gladwell proposes, is we tried to solve a mystery as if it were a puzzle. I pose that the challenge of truly succeeding in Counter-IED efforts is that we are approaching a mystery as a puzzle, and perhaps not knowing the difference. Using puzzle solving processes, to include assessing results/success/intelligence, on a mystery problem may be the proverbial “wrong tool for the job.” No matter your effort, your starting point/approach is all wrong, and won’t get better.

Do influence practitioners fall into the same trap? Our effects cousin, field artillery, operates in a “puzzle” battle-space: those practitioners know the physical layout, they engage when the enemy is found, fill in the blanks of the puzzle with assessments, repeat process. The influence or true information aspects of IO operate on a mystery basis: no eyes on target, receipt confirmation difficult, time and difficulty in assessing effects and causal actions, etc. This is why the OODA loop has been a flawed process when applied to IO: it’s a puzzle process and IO is a mystery. It’s the difference between two boxers in a ring (classic OODA loop situation: I know my opponent is going to engage; the puzzle is when, how, how hard and how frequent) and a boxer walking down a dark alley in a bad neighborhood in a nice suit and a lot of bling, facing a potential hidden opponent. The first is a puzzle, the second is a mystery.

Influence is mystery construct. Just because we know who how and maybe when to influence doesn’t mean it’s less of a mystery. Do we falter because we try to make it a puzzle with our approach to processes such as MOE? Presence, access, and awareness might be distinguishing qualifiers of a puzzle versus a mystery. A Tactical MISO Team that operates in a brigade AO might have success treating its problem-set as a puzzle, but what about a regional MISOTF? A GCC JSITF? Definitely at the mystery level, but our processes, doctrine, if not our analytical intuition drive to treat it as a puzzle. Are we using the wrong tools and mindset in strategic and operational IO, SC, MISO, PA or influence activity in general?

**An afterthought: How I would categorize the functions of the various IO capabilities-
Puzzle: EW, OPSEC, Deception, CNO, (CMO?), tactical MISO, KLE
Mystery: IO, SC, MISO, PA

Friday, March 11, 2011

The PSYOP CODEL brouhaha

I have avoided commenting on the Runaway General II for several weeks now, mainly because I didn't want to jump in with only limited facts. What has emerged has made for interesting discussion.

First has been the inevitable character evaluation of LTC Michael Holmes, who has seemed to have launched his own information campaign to rally support for his version. I don't blame him; if my career was in jeopardy, I'd go on the offensive too. What is clear is he was disgruntled/disappointed/frustrated at training for a deployment to lead an IO Field Support Team and then arrived to find he would be anything but. This is a failure of the TIOG who manages the FSTs and NTM-A to waste a resource that should have been shifted elsewhere. But this is key-the IO team was NOT doing the IO team job. As happens often, warm bodies were parceled out. It doesn't matter what the training, or intended job, an officer assigned to protocol is working protocol, not IO or PSYOP or whatever. The chief of staff may have used poor choice of words ["get in their minds"] but the task was not illegal if LTC Holmes was not in an IO-related role.

Second has been the discussion of influencing versus communicating. There is nothing in the article that would qualify as PSYOP or even subversive influencing. What occured goes by other terms-lobbying, persuading. In college we learn to write persuasion papers and give persuasion speeches; this intent is not labeled "PSYOP" in any manner. In the military we learn to develop decision and information briefs. Heck, even a COA brief to the commander is usually based on and includes information planners/XO provides to get the commander to select the COA WE want. Briefs are tainted, especially if not done by your own staff. It is almost insulting to suggest the CODELs are naive enough to not know there is a persuasion/lobbying element in the presentations. We are talking about politicians here.
Communicating and influencing are not crimes; what would have been egregious, but never mentioned, if deception was involved. The issue was "how do we get the CODEL to support xyz" and not "We need the CODEL to believe the training level of Afghan security forces is much different than reality so they will support xyz." NTM-A wanted more resources, and the CODEL was the path to obtain that, but nothing in the article or discussions suggest that NTM-A employed underhanded or illegal methods.

A third issue I have is in both cases of Hastings writing about "Runaway Generals" is he provides information of improper attitudes and comments of a staff working for the Generals, but not the Generals themselves. In LTG Caldwell's case, it is his Chief of Staff who made the controversial comments and gave the orders, not the General.

Friday, February 18, 2011

Using IO Practitioners in the Government Sector


How do we bring our understanding of the information battle space to the civilian government sector? Agencies other than DOD have a limitation in personnel and resources staffing. Therefore it would make sense to explore multipliers to complement existing intelligence and operations. Who might benefit by cherry picking the most relevant and effective IO related capabilities, doctrine and employment successes? DOS is an obvious choice, but what about DHS? DEA? FBI? Can the FBI use an IO planner to fix a fugitive, or make him move? Obstacles to such thinking might mirror overcoming of the dismissive warrior mentality in DOD. But soft concepts are no longer unsexy pie-in-the-sky bright ideas-it has been proven in hostile and limiting environments and embraced if not trumpeted by warrior leaders.
Leaflets aside, why can’t we use the same inter-agency (IA) collaboration developed to find AMZ, AAM, or a number of other highly valuable individuals? But instead of it residing in DOD, it resides in the IA, supported by civilian (not military) or contracted planners. If IO can work with intel and ops in the hunt for AAM, why can’t it be done domestically as well as internationally for terrorists or high value individuals? The principles are enabling or exploiting operation and information success, synchronizing to support FBI or DEA operation objectives/intelligence collection requirements (do we want suspect to move/communicate, not move/communicate, communicate). Very likely that pieces (public information releases, EW, etc) are being done, but think back 10, 7 or even 4 years ago to when commander’s/staffs thought they were already doing IO because they had a Public Affairs officer or a Tactical PSYOP Detachment in direct support. The eaches don’t essentially equate to  the whole if not part of a broader and deliberate information environment concept to support achieving objectives, and the IO practitioners and the commanders and staffs they support have learned this well in the last five years. So if there is practical application in the government sector, consider the target audience that has to buy into this to be where our military leadership at various levels was 8-10 years ago.
The payoff is government agencies incorporating the IO practitioner capability for operational effectiveness. Since there are no civilian schools or feeder systems to create such a skillset, at least initially it may be contracted to quickly bring in those civilians and military who have developed said fundamentals, skills and intuition to support ops/intel.

Wednesday, January 26, 2011

SECDEF releases Joint IO/SC reorg memo//25 Jan 2011

SECDEF released yesterday a memo outlining his decisions that effect the Joint IO/SC fields (I do not have a soft copy), namely IO management/oversight moving to USD(P), the USD (P) and ASD (PA) are co-leads for SC, and the re-org of JIOWC. I will write on the opinions/impact this will have on Joint IO. From the wording, it looks positive.

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

Army War College Releases new Primer

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/

A chance to get a cohesive update of the application and relevance of IO to DOD. Description from the AWC website:

"This latest revision of the Information Operations Primer provides an overview of Department of Defense (DoD) Information Operations (IO) doctrine and organizations at the joint and individual service levels. It is primarily intended to serve as a ready reference for IO information extracted and summarized from a variety of sources. Wherever possible, Internet web sites have been given to provide access to additional and more up-to-date information.

        The IO Primer begins with an overview of Information Operations, Strategic Communication and Cyberspace / Cyberspace Operations. (Note: as the emergent concept of Cyberspace Operations continues to assume increasing importance, the Primer has expanded to include discussion and input of this topic.) It then goes from the national level to the Department of Defense, to the Combatant Command level and then finally to the service level. At each level it describes strategies or doctrine, agencies, organizations, and educational institutions dedicated to the information element of national power. "

Can experienced IO Practitioners help DOS?


Does Department of State do regional/operational level strategies for objectives? Does South America department have a linked cohesive nested strategy in a region (like a COCOM) for PD, relations, and SC and development, or is it bottom driven? Does the country embassy determine objectives simply for his own country (his battlespace), and State just collates objectives for a region and conduct  a loose operation oversight, or do country embassy tie into its neighbors? DOS could benefit from top developed IO concepts/strategies that provide a cohesive focus without interfering in each embassy's operations.

Commercialization of IO

how do we make money from this accelerated accumulation of skills and knowledge? What aspect of operational and warrior IO can be beneficial to the private sector? What could we offer that an in house PR staff couldn’t perform (crisis assessment, plan, react). Ad men know how to sell to people. What do we know about people that are as equally valuable?

What’s the private sector demand/niche for an out-of-work IO contractor extraordinaire?

What’s the private sector demand/niche for an out-of-work IO contractor extraordinaire?
Forward thinking Defense contracting companies should be mapping a strategy on the commercial/private industry application of warrior IO skills/experience. As one war winds down, and limited and possible dwindling funding for the remaining smaller war, the lucrative defense industry may soon see far less contracts in high demand areas of IO and intel. Don’t want to survive by being lucky, survive by being prescient. When the supplemental wave crashes, will you end up on the beach beached or on another breaker?
How do we bring our understanding of the information battlespace to the civilian government sector? DOS is an obvious choice, but what about DHS? DEA? FBI? Can the FBI use an IO planner to fix a fugitive, or make him move? Leaflets aside, why can’t we use the same IA collaboration developed to find AAM, but instead of it residing in DOD, it resides in the IA, supported by civ (not military) or contracted planners. If IO can work with intel and ops in the hunt for AAM, why can’t it be done domestically as well as internationally? The principles of enabling or exploiting operation and information success, synchronizing to support FBI or DEA operation objectives/intelligence collection requirements (do we want suspect to move/communicate, not move/communicate, communicate). Very likely that pieces are being done, but think back 10, 7 or even 4 years ago to when commander’s/staffs thought they were already doing IO because they had a Public Affairs officer or a TPD in direct support. The eaches don’t essentially make the whole, and the IO practitioners and the commanders and staffs they support have learned this well in the last five years. So if there is practical application in the government sector, consider the target audience that has to buy into this to be where our military leadership at various levels was 8-10 years ago.
The payoff is government agencies incorporating the IO practitioner capability for operational effectiveness. Since there are no civilian schools or feeder systems to create such a skillset, at least initially it may be contracted to quickly bring in those civilians and military who have developed said fundamentals, skills and intuition to support ops/intel.

Thursday, December 9, 2010

a must website for IO practitioners

MtnRunner posted this link http://lnkd.in/uibExp to the late Phil Taylor's website, intended to be one stop shopping for SC/influence intellectual info sharing. It is a must visit.A treasure trove of material. Sad it took his passing to discover it. And, he was a Black Adder fan.