Trying to Solve Mysteries as Puzzles -do influencers have it wrong?

An excellent book I just finished reading was Malcolm Gladwell’s “What the Dog Saw”. I occasionally find his stories and points having great relevance to the field of influence (Is there any concept better boiled down than “stickiness” to describe influence objectives?). In the chapter Open Secrets, he breaks down if were really deceived by Enron by proposing there are two approaches to information gathering as it relates to solving either a puzzle or a mystery (his thesis is Enron was not a mystery because it provided full disclosure in all of its filing, it’s just that the amount and confusing projection of the information made it a puzzle to solve) . For the Cold War, intelligence gathering was solving a puzzle—we knew the players and boundaries, we just needed to “fill in the blanks” here and there. The hunt for UBL--a mystery. If it was a “fill in the blanks” puzzle problem-set, we would have much more quickly ended this hunt. The problem was, Gladwell proposes, is we tried to solve a mystery as if it were a puzzle. I pose that the challenge of truly succeeding in Counter-IED efforts is that we are approaching a mystery as a puzzle, and perhaps not knowing the difference. Using puzzle solving processes, to include assessing results/success/intelligence, on a mystery problem may be the proverbial “wrong tool for the job.” No matter your effort, your starting point/approach is all wrong, and won’t get better.

Do influence practitioners fall into the same trap? Our effects cousin, field artillery, operates in a “puzzle” battle-space: those practitioners know the physical layout, they engage when the enemy is found, fill in the blanks of the puzzle with assessments, repeat process. The influence or true information aspects of IO operate on a mystery basis: no eyes on target, receipt confirmation difficult, time and difficulty in assessing effects and causal actions, etc. This is why the OODA loop has been a flawed process when applied to IO: it’s a puzzle process and IO is a mystery. It’s the difference between two boxers in a ring (classic OODA loop situation: I know my opponent is going to engage; the puzzle is when, how, how hard and how frequent) and a boxer walking down a dark alley in a bad neighborhood in a nice suit and a lot of bling, facing a potential hidden opponent. The first is a puzzle, the second is a mystery.

Influence is mystery construct. Just because we know who how and maybe when to influence doesn’t mean it’s less of a mystery. Do we falter because we try to make it a puzzle with our approach to processes such as MOE? Presence, access, and awareness might be distinguishing qualifiers of a puzzle versus a mystery. A Tactical MISO Team that operates in a brigade AO might have success treating its problem-set as a puzzle, but what about a regional MISOTF? A GCC JSITF? Definitely at the mystery level, but our processes, doctrine, if not our analytical intuition drive to treat it as a puzzle. Are we using the wrong tools and mindset in strategic and operational IO, SC, MISO, PA or influence activity in general?

**An afterthought: How I would categorize the functions of the various IO capabilities-

Puzzle: EW, OPSEC, Deception, CNO, (CMO?), tactical MISO, KLE

Mystery: IO, SC, MISO, PA

Using IO Practitioners in the Government Sector

How do we bring our understanding of the information battle space to the civilian government sector? Agencies other than DOD have a limitation in personnel and resources staffing. Therefore it would make sense to explore multipliers to complement existing intelligence and operations. Who might benefit by cherry picking the most relevant and effective IO related capabilities, doctrine and employment successes? DOS is an obvious choice, but what about DHS? DEA? FBI? Can the FBI use an IO planner to fix a fugitive, or make him move? Obstacles to such thinking might mirror overcoming of the dismissive warrior mentality in DOD. But soft concepts are no longer unsexy pie-in-the-sky bright ideas-it has been proven in hostile and limiting environments and embraced if not trumpeted by warrior leaders.

Leaflets aside, why can’t we use the same inter-agency (IA) collaboration developed to find AMZ, AAM, or a number of other highly valuable individuals? But instead of it residing in DOD, it resides in the IA, supported by civilian (not military) or contracted planners. If IO can work with intel and ops in the hunt for AAM, why can’t it be done domestically as well as internationally for terrorists or high value individuals? The principles are enabling or exploiting operation and information success, synchronizing to support FBI or DEA operation objectives/intelligence collection requirements (do we want suspect to move/communicate, not move/communicate, communicate). Very likely that pieces (public information releases, EW, etc) are being done, but think back 10, 7 or even 4 years ago to when commander’s/staffs thought they were already doing IO because they had a Public Affairs officer or a Tactical PSYOP Detachment in direct support. The eaches don’t essentially equate to  the whole if not part of a broader and deliberate information environment concept to support achieving objectives, and the IO practitioners and the commanders and staffs they support have learned this well in the last five years. So if there is practical application in the government sector, consider the target audience that has to buy into this to be where our military leadership at various levels was 8-10 years ago.

The payoff is government agencies incorporating the IO practitioner capability for operational effectiveness. Since there are no civilian schools or feeder systems to create such a skillset, at least initially it may be contracted to quickly bring in those civilians and military who have developed said fundamentals, skills and intuition to support ops/intel.

SECDEF releases Joint IO/SC reorg memo//25 Jan 2011

SECDEF released yesterday a memo outlining his decisions that effect the Joint IO/SC fields (I do not have a soft copy), namely IO management/oversight moving to USD(P), the USD (P) and ASD (PA) are co-leads for SC, and the re-org of JIOWC. I will write on the opinions/impact this will have on Joint IO. From the wording, it looks positive.

Army War College Releases new Primer

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/

A chance to get a cohesive update of the application and relevance of IO to DOD. Description from the AWC website:

"This latest revision of the Information Operations Primer provides an overview of Department of Defense (DoD) Information Operations (IO) doctrine and organizations at the joint and individual service levels. It is primarily intended to serve as a ready reference for IO information extracted and summarized from a variety of sources. Wherever possible, Internet web sites have been given to provide access to additional and more up-to-date information.

        The IO Primer begins with an overview of Information Operations, Strategic Communication and Cyberspace / Cyberspace Operations. (Note: as the emergent concept of Cyberspace Operations continues to assume increasing importance, the Primer has expanded to include discussion and input of this topic.) It then goes from the national level to the Department of Defense, to the Combatant Command level and then finally to the service level. At each level it describes strategies or doctrine, agencies, organizations, and educational institutions dedicated to the information element of national power. "

My first encounter with the Afghan National Army (ANA)

I went with co-workers on Friday to trail climb Mount Ghar in Kabul, which is on an ANA base. Ghar means mount/mountain in Dari, so essentially we climbed Mount Mountain. Popular activity as it only open for specific hours on one day, as Ghar resides inside an active range. Ghar gives a great view of surrounding topography as well as the carcasses of Soviet tanks and BMPs left behind a few decades ago.

    As we were ascending, ANA officer candidates (OCS) were descending. The first few did not return the greeting of "Salaam" as they seemed singularly focused on reaching the parking lot to declare "first!" The main body candidates were much more easy going and jovial, especially after I initiated a Dari greeting. They stopped to smile, get their picture taken with me, or have me take their picture. I got a glimpse of real people, volunteers to not only fight for their country, but also go the extra step to be leaders of that effort. That short experience provided me a glimmer of hope that Afghanistan indeed has the capacity to develop a professional force of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Granted, there were a few bubbas that probably weren't going to see graduation day. And while I bit my tongue on how some candidates were carrying their weapons, I finally broke and on the spot corrected the last candidate I saw who was banging his barrel on the rocks by his feet. The fact he was going to be last off of the Ghar probably indicated he would be in the "thanks for playing" group that gets an early bus ride home.